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Abstract
Business-to-business (B2B) exchanges are expected to bring about lower prices for buyers through reverse auctions.
Analysis of such settings for seller pricing behavior often points to mixed-strategy equilibria. In real life, it is plausible that
managers learn this complex ideal behavior over time. We modeled the two-seller game in a synthetic environment, where two
agents use a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm to change their pricing strategy over time. We find that the agents do indeed
converge towards the theoretical Nash equilibrium. The results are promising enough to consider the use of artificial learning
mechanisms in electronic marketplace transactions.
D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Online exchanges for business-to-business (or
B2B) transactions have become ubiquitous in indus-
tries ranging from automotive to retailing. The Wall
Street Journal [17] recently mentioned the remarkable
turnaround of the B2B Internet commerce sector, and
that US businesses spent $482 billion in B2B trans-
actions, up 242% from 2 years before. The online
research and consulting firm Jupiter Media Metrix
predicts that $5.4 trillion in goods and services
transacted online among businesses by 2006, while
a more optimistic Gartner Group forecast estimates
worldwide B2B commerce to swell to $5.9 trillion by
the end of 2004. Forrester Research indicates that in
Q3 2001, 49% of organizations that buy more than $1
billion per year reported using an online auction, with
most of them increasing their usage of these venues.
One of the more prominent advantages of B2B
exchangesislowercostsofbuyersduetoautomationof
the procurement process, reverse auctions, interoper-
ability among users, collaborative planning and col-
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www.elsevier.com/locate/dswlaborative design [8]. For example, Ford announced in
July 2001 that it had saved $70 million through
Covisint (the online automotive exchange by the Big
Three automakers) in terms of reduced paperwork and
lower seller prices, which is more than its initial
investment in the exchange [8]. Carrier, the worlds
largest air-conditioning company, realized savings of
over 15% in the cost of components by putting its
requirements to a larger universe of sellers through an
online exchange [7].
As B2B marketplaces evolve, one of the emerging
roles of these marketplaces is seen as a demand
aggregator for the buyers as well as a specialist in
qualifying sellers [21]. Ref. [2] analyzed the competi-
tion between sellers in reverse auctions in a game-
theoretic framework, and established the Nash equi-
libria in several scenarios. It was found that in an
environment where sellers can collectively cater to the
total demand, with the final (i.e. the highest-bidding)
seller catering to a residual, the sellers resort to a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. While price ran-
domization in industrial bids is an accepted norm, it
may be argued that managers in reality do not resort to
advanced game theory calculations to bid for an order.
What is more likely is that managers learn that
strategy over time and finally converge towards the
theoretic equilibrium. This paper tests that assertion
by modeling the sellers behavior with artificial
software agents that start bidding randomly, and use
a simple reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm to
blearnQ the ideal strategy over time.
The importance of such learning algorithms is
potentially very large. As electronic marketplaces
proliferate among organizations, transactions such as
bidding for buyer requirements in reverse auctions
become ubiquitous. While arguably simple trans-
actions like those analyzed in this research will make
way for more complex auction mechanisms (for
example, those which limit the number of sellers in
terms of quality, product differentiation, etc.), it is
undeniable that transactions in online marketplaces
are here to stay. Monitoring potentially hundreds (or
even thousands) of such concurrent transactions
individually by human agents will conceivably be
very difficult and time-consuming, if not impossible.
One promising solution might be to look at artificial
agents and whether they can mimic human behavior
in such environments. While our experimental setting
and the particular RL algorithm used might be too
simplistic for real-life scenarios (and is in fact found
inadequate for generalized settings), it nevertheless
shows promise that even complex mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria can be assimilated in artificial agent
behavior through simple reinforcement learning
mechanisms. Successful learning in this environment
should spur further research with more complex
algorithms to handle real world transactions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the background literature surround-
ing the nature of the competition that we use for
testing our learning algorithms. The use of artificial
software agents and reinforcement learning in model-
ing such games is also discussed in Section 2. The
model of the reverse auction for both two and n-
sellers is provided in Section 3. Section 5 states the
research assertions and hypotheses that are tested in
the simulation experiment. Section 4 presents the RL
algorithm deployed in the simulation. Results of the
experiments are provided in Section 5 and the
conclusions and future research directions are dis-
cussed in Section 6.
2. Background literature
2.1. Analysis of the market
The competition among sellers in the environment
mentioned above is different from the traditional
oligopolistic Cournot competition between firms
facing a downward facing demand curve, where both
firms sell at the same price point. It is also distinct
from a capacity-constrained Bertrand model that has
been analyzed extensively in the literature, where a
quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition
yield Cournot outcomes that have equilibrium prices
above marginal cost [11].
The analysis of Ref. [2] also established the nature
of the equilibrium under various assumptions of the
sellers cost, capacities and the market demand. It is to
be noted that the two-seller model has been analyzed
by Ref. [13], but the method of analysis in Ref. [2]
provides a way to generalize the results to the n-seller
model, which is what we use in our simulations. The
problem is most interesting when we assume that
there is no combined capacity constraint as such: the
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birth of the exchange, and continue to do so after it
comes into play. However, it is conceivable that the
firms individually cannot supply to the entire market.
In fact, as shown in Ref. [2], the fear of being stranded
as the highest priced seller who does not supply
anything essentially reduces the competition to
Bertrand, with all sellers supplying at cost. Since the
set of sellers is limited and all are reputed in the
marketplace, the buyers would not mind getting their
orders fulfilled by any one or several of these sellers.
This means that while there is a competition between
the firms to be the low-price bidder, it is not as
extreme as a Bertrand game that results in prices equal
to marginal cost. However, there remains an incentive
to be the low-price bidder and have the bfirst
invitationQ to supply a requirement. We note that in
practice the bidder with the lowest cost is not always
the winning bidderhowever, under the assumptions
of the model, with the buyer having no other
preference than price for a homogeneous good, we
make the assumption that a low-price seller is invited
to supply to any residual demand before a high-price
seller.
Let us suppose that there are two buyers who
bought from two sellers (one from each) before the
advent of the exchange.
1 What may have prevented
buyers from establishing contact with both the sellers
(and vice versa) are the search costs and the ongoing
cost of establishing relationships within a large
organization.Someofthesecostsarededicatedaccount
management teams for buyers, sales force for sellers,
cost of sending individual RFQs to the entire universe
of sellers, etc. [10].
2 With the lack of competition, the
sellers could afford to sell the required quantities to the
buyersattheirreservationprice,whichweassumetobe
the same for both buyers at r. With the advent of the
exchange, the buyers put forward their requirements to
the exchange, and the sellers can then bid for the total
requirement from both buyers.
Next, we discuss how the above market can be
simulated by the use of intelligent artificial software
agents. The use of simulation allows repeated and
detailed study of the behaviors exhibited by the sellers
in the market under various experimental treatment
conditions. These artificial agents are endowed the
ability to learn from previous actions by the use of a
type of Reinforcement Learning algorithm described
below.
2.2. Artificial software agents and reinforcement
learning
Artificial agents have been used to simulate human
agents or sellers in a number of different settings. For
example, Ref. [15] used artificial software agents to
conduct automated negotiations in an e-commerce
environment. The use of artificial agents is advocated
by Ref. [4] to study systems and structures from the
bbottom upQ, which is especially useful when it is
difficult to obtain a closed form solution to the
problem at hand.
Reinforcement learning is a machine learning
technique that is quite useful in situations where
artificial agents need to blearnQ from previous actions
in order to carry out their functions. RL agents
typically have a goal, receive feedback or input from
the environment, can make a decision or undertake
some action in response to the feedback from the
environment. Additionally, a great deal of uncertainty
is usually incorporated into the RL agent environment.
By incorporating this uncertainty, a more realistic
model of the problem is created [19]. For example, an
RL agent might have a goal to win a simple auction by
making the highest bid (within a specific bound). The
agent would receive as feedback from its environment
indicating whether the agent won the auction with the
bid that was tendered. The bid tendered in the next
round would be adjusted based on the information
received from the previous round. Moreover, in the
earlier rounds of the auction, the RL agent would
operate under much uncertainty as it learns the bidding
behavior of other agents participating in the auction,
just as a human agent would.
RL has been used to examine various competitive
scenarios such as sealed bid k-double auction under
asymmetric and incomplete information dynamics
[16], market entry games [5] and rule learning in
1 The example is just illustrative, and is not crucial to the
analysis. There can in fact be only a single large buyer, whose
requirements cannot be met by one seller; however, the two sellers
together have a combined capacity that is more than the buyers
requirement.
2 It has been estimated that in terms of reduction of paperwork
alone, B2B exchanges can bring down costs per purchase order
from $75$150 to $10$30 [8].
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the application presented in this paper due to the
ability of RL agents to incorporate previous experi-
ence (either reward or no reward) into action. The
model under which the artificial agents operate in this
research is discussed in the next section.
3. The model
The generalized n-seller model derives much of its
intuition from the basic two-seller model, and there-
fore it is instructive to first consider the two-seller
model in detail. We consider the case when both
sellers have equal capacities K that is less than the
respective individual requirements of the buyers, but
their combined capacity is lesser than the total
requirement of both buyers Q (i.e. 2KQN0). In such
a setting, the lower priced seller is invited first to sell
the required quantity, and after he has supplied his
total capacity K, the other seller can then sell the
residual demand QK. Both sellers have a common
fixed marginal cost of production, c.
From the modeling point of view, it is important to
note is that the entire requirement Q is auctioned to
the sellers, and for any unfulfilled demand, a lower
priced bidder is invited before a higher priced bidder
to satisfy the unfulfilled demand. It is readily apparent
that with unlimited capacity, the sellers respond with a
Bertrand competition in prices with the seller or
sellers with the lowest marginal cost outbidding the
others.
3 This is not to the advantage of the sellers. Ref.
[11] (and several variants of the original model, such
as Ref. [1]) shows that if sellers could limit capacity,
then a quantity precommitment and Bertrand com-
petition yield Cournot outcomes that have equilibrium
prices above marginal cost. At the other end of the
spectrum, if the total capacity of the sellers is so
limited as to be less than the total demand, it is easy to
see that the sellers can sell their entire capacities at the
buyers reservation price.
4
It is realistic to think of sellers having limited
capacities so that any one seller cannot meet market
demand. Further, keeping in mind the discussion of
the previous paragraph, we stipulate that the aggre-
gate output of the sellers exceeds total quantity
demanded and that a firm sells all it can produce
only if it is the low-price seller. That is, the lowest
priced seller sells to capacity, but a higher priced
seller only sells to a residual demand. Sellers there-
fore are pulled by two opposing bforcesQon one
hand, higher prices fetch higher margins, but on the
other, higher prices bring about increased chances of
being underbid by competition.
The analysis shows that there exists a mixed-
strategy equilibrium of prices where the sellers
randomize between a range of prices. The intuition
behind such an equilibrium is as follows: with two
similar sellers, there cannot be any equilibrium in pure
strategies with the sellers settling on different prices.
Settling on the same price is also ruled out, since the
best response to any price is to set a price that is an
infinitesimal amount e lower than that price. Thus, if
any Nash equilibrium exists, it has to be a mixed-
strategy equilibrium. It can further be shown that the
support of the strategy lies between p1and r, where r is
the reservation price for the buyer and p1 is given by
p1 
r  c  Q  K 
K
 c  1 
An intuitive way of looking at p1 is that below this
price, a seller makes less profit by bwinningQ (supply
to capacity) than by blosingQ and supplying the
residual at the highest possible price r (which is the
best price the seller can supply the residual, since he is
losing anyway).
The equilibrium strategy for either seller can be
expressed in terms of their price randomizing cumu-
lative probability density function F(p):
Fp  
p  c  K  r  c  Q  K 
p  c  2 K  Q 
 2 
This is a continuous probability distribution within
the range (p1, r), and effectively defines the
symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy of the two
sellers (i.e. the sellers). The sellers randomize their
bids within this interval, such that their randomizing
has a probability distribution given by F(p) in Eq. (2).
3 If seller 1 knows that seller 2 can supply to the entire demand,
he responds by charging seller 2s marginal price, since the best
response of seller 2 at any higher price is to undercut it by an
infinitesimal amount.
4 Since either seller can sell to capacity, there is no incentive for
either to undercut competition.
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expected return of the sellers.
The analysis is similar for the n-seller model, where
the highest bidder supplies the residual, and the rest
supply to capacity ((n1)KbQbnK). The support of
the strategy for the sellers is given by (p1
n, r), where
pn
1 
r  c  Q  n  1  K 
K
 c  3 
and the expression for the distribution function is
given by
Fn p  
pc  K  Q  n  1  K  r  c 
p  c  nK  Q 
 1
n1
4
While price randomization in industrial bids is an
accepted norm, it might be difficult to accept that
managers go through advanced game theory calcu-
lations (and in any case, the real-life situations are far
more varied than the simplified model scenarios that
make any game theory analysis extremely complex) to
determine their bids. It is conceivable that sellers learn
from their past experiences to bid in a fashion that
maximizes their surplus. It is this assertion that we test
in the remainder of this paper.
4. The algorithm
To test our assertion, we model the competing
sellers as artificial software agents. We examine both
the two-seller and the n-seller cases. Like human
subjects, we propose that these agents bunderstandQ the
following (without resorting to explicit bknowledgeQ
of game theory):
1. There are two opposing forces in the pricing
strategya higher price (towards r) means greater
per-unit profit, but also brings about a higher
probability of blosingQ to the competition (in terms
of being the first invited bidder to supply the
demand).
2. It does not make any sense to price below p1,a si s
clear from the above analysis.
3. Since there is a need to balance between higher
probability of winning and higher per-unit profit,
there is no a priori reason to rule out any price
between p1 and r, and therefore, there is reason not
to rule out a price-randomizing solution (at least
initially).
Fig. 1 describes the simple RL algorithm that the
agents employ in a two-seller game to determine their
prices. The algorithm is essentially the same for the n-
seller model, except that we use p1
n to determine the
support of prices, and compare the experimental
distribution with Fn(p) rather than F(p).
Stated formally, let us denote the average profit for
subdivision i as of time t as P ¯ it and the average profit
across generalized n subdivisions as
P ¯
t 
 n
i1
P ¯
it

n
 5 
In this case, the probability of choosing a price
from subdivision i is given by
Wit 
P ¯
it
nP ¯
t

 n
i1
P ¯
it
n
6
Note that
n
i1wit  1, as is required of a
probability distribution.
The bsellersQ thus start off initially with a totally
random pricing strategy (i.e. the price distribution is
uniform in its support), with the hope of learning over
time about the ideal nature of the randomization. This
is the same assumption as employed by Ref. [6] in
their experiments and referred to as the binitial
propensitiesQ of the sellers for their pure strategies.
Thus, we attempt to find out whether through a
relatively simple reinforcement learning algorithm, the
sellers can finally converge on the arguably more
sophisticated theoretical equilibrium. The rationale for
the algorithm is as follows: since the sellers a priori
have no reason to believe that some prices are more
likely than others, they start off by selecting any price
in the range (p1, r) with uniform probability. However,
by subdividing the support and noting in which
subdivision each winning or losing price falls, they
ensure that they are aware of any emerging pattern of
wins and losses. The stipulation of choosing at least 10
prices in each subdivision for either seller is to ensure
that when the sellers start making any judgment
regarding which price ranges should be favored more
over others, they have some amount of experience to
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component of reinforcement learning in Ref. [19]. The
sellers are learning the landscape of the problem space
during this component. The exploitation component of
the reinforcement learning algorithm then comes into
play (Step 5), and each subsequent win with a price
within a subdivision ensuring higher probability to that
subdivision being picked up in the next game. This is
essentially the Law of Effect in actionchoices that
have led to good outcomes in the past are more likely
to be repeated in the future [20].
If we denote the average profit of seller j (j=1, 2)
in division k (k=1,10) in simulation round t as
Cjk(t), then the probability pjk(t+1) of choosing that
division in round t+1 is given by
pjk t  1  
j
jk
t 
 10
k1
j
jk
t 
 7 
The game is then repeated a sufficient number of
times so that the sellers can hopefully learn sufficiently
to converge to the ideal distribution. The experiment
can be repeated with other values of Q, K, c and r.
The algorithm described above finds support in the
work by Ref. [14] for the proof of the existence
theorem. Ref. [14] uses a scenario in which sellers
adjust their strategies to give greater weight to those
pure strategies that are currently best against the
strategies of the remaining sellers [12].
5. Hypothesis testing, results and discussion
5.1. The two-seller simulations
For testing the assertion, we selected various
values of Q, K, c and r. In the two-seller model
Fig. 1. Algorithm for sellers on B2B exchange.
Table 1
Various values of capacity (K) and costs (c) (with Q and r fixed)
Q=100 units, r=$80
KC
65 20
65 40
65 60
80 20
80 40
80 60
51 20
51 40
51 60
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and F(p) that the drivers of interest are the values
(2KQ) and (rc). If the combined capacity (2K)i s
barely more than the demand (Q), the sellers have
little incentive to lower prices, while if there is a large
amount of overcapacity, the sellers would greatly
reduce prices, since losing would mean catering to a
very small residual demand. The difference (rc)o n
the other hand would determine the range of the
support of prices. We keep Q (the total quantity
demanded) fixed at 100 units and r (the reservation
price) fixed at $80. The values of K chosen reflect the
amount of overcapacity: at K=65, we have moderate
overcapacity, prompting moderate competition; at
K=80, the possibility of supplying only a small
fraction of the demand (i.e. if the seller bids the
higher price, he ends up supplying the residual of only
20 units) should prompt more severe competition; and
finally, for K=51, the competition would be very
limited, since the seller knows that even by bidding a
higher price, he will end up supplying 49 units out of
his total capacity of 51 units. For each of these values
of K, we choose three values of c, the marginal cost,
$20, $40 and $60. Thus, there are a total of nine
simulations that are run for the purposes of this
experiment. The various variable combinations are
summarized in Table 1.
The results are shown in Tables 210. For each of
the pairs of values of K and c in Table 1, we calculate
p1 and corresponding subdivision limits, which are
shown in the Bin column. After running the simu-
lation as described above, we find out the number of
times the prices are picked in each subdivision, and
this is given in the Frequency (Oi) column. The
Table 2
Simulation run results with K=65 units, c=$20
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq. dist.
(Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
55.07692308 185 171.0526316 171.0526316 1.137247
57.84615385 156 317.0731707 146.0205392 0.682025
60.61538462 140 443.1818182 126.1086475 1.530186
63.38461538 126 553.1914894 110.0096712 2.324256
66.15384615 93 650 96.80851064 0.149829
68.92307692 76 735.8490566 85.8490566 1.129936
71.69230769 67 812.5 76.6509434 1.215128
74.46153846 59 881.3559322 68.8559322 1.410763
77.23076923 52 943.5483871 62.19245489 1.670398
80 46 1000 56.4516129 1.935041
1000 1000 13.18481 16.92
Table 3
Simulation run results with K=65 units, c=$40
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
63.386 190 171.1707859 171 2.071260584
65.232 157 317.1633904 146 0.829923933
67.078 139 443.2503631 126 1.32247027
68.924 111 553.2429816 110 0.009226233
70.77 102 650.0379157 97 0.279898025
72.616 77 735.8760527 86 0.909999532
74.462 72 812.5181359 77 0.281163248
76.308 54 881.3668246 69 3.202436519
78.154 51 943.553319 62 2.01229638
80 47 1000 56 1.580957113
1000 1000 12.49963184 16.92
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retically expected number of observations in each
subdivision, and this is presented in the Ei column.
We compute the v
2 statistic as
10
i1
OiEi 
2
E i , and this
is compared with the corresponding chi-square value
with p=0.05 (16.92). Formally stated, we would reject
the null hypothesis that the data follows the distribu-
tion specified in Eq. (2), if the calculated v
2 exceeded
the corresponding v
2value with a significance level a
of 0.05:
H0: Fn(p)=Fn *(p) where Fn *(p) is the experimentally
generated distribution.
H1: Fn(p)pFn *(p)
The simulation results show that as expected
from the theoretical results, lower prices are
preferred over higher prices. The only slight
discrepancy is seen in the case of K=51 units, but
that result is easily explained within limits of
experimental error. When K=51 units, the winner
gets to sell to capacity at 51 units, while the loser
gets to sell 49 unitswhich is almost as good as
being the winner. In fact, thanks to the higher price,
the difference between the profits between the
winner and the loser is very small. However, note
that by design, the winner of the auction always
makes slightly more money than the loser. Thus, the
frequency distribution of the theoretical distribution
shows that the frequency by which the prices in the
lowest subdivision gets selected is almost the same
as the frequency by which prices in the highest
subdivision gets selected. The lack of the uniformly
falling frequencies in the experimental results can
therefore be attributed to the randomness in the
process.
Table 4
Simulation run results with K=65 units, c=$60
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
71.69230769 176 171.0526316 171 0.143093117
72.61538462 152 317.0731707 146 0.244855636
73.53846154 133 443.1818182 126 0.376585912
74.46153846 109 553.1914894 110 0.009266784
75.38461538 86 650 97 1.206752397
76.30769231 78 735.8490566 86 0.717628032
77.23076923 75 812.5 77 0.035558781
78.15384615 67 881.3559322 69 0.050024511
79.07692308 68 943.5483871 62 0.052534014
80 56 1000 56 0.351041475
1000 1000 3.187340659 16.92
Table 5
Simulation run results with K=80 units, c=$20
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
39.5 310 307.6923077 308 0.017307692
44 201 500 192 0.392892308
48.5 140 631.5789474 132 0.538947368
53 92 727.2727273 96 0.142579904
57.5 77 800 73 0.251022727
62 56 857.1428571 57 0.022857143
66.5 41 903.2258065 46 0.560649309
71 35 941.1764706 38 0.229414137
75.5 28 972.972973 32 0.453302385
80 20 1000 27 1.827027027
1000 1000 4.436 16.92
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in the results. If we compare the results of when K is 65
units with those of when K is 80 units (for example, the
results in Tables 2 and 5, where the c is same at $20),
the observed frequencies in the lowest three bins is
much higher when K is 80 units, as compared to when
K is 65 units. Correspondingly, the observed frequen-
cies in the other bins are lower when K is 80 units, as
compared to when K is 65 units. In other words, when
there is relatively more overcapacity, sellers have the
risk of losing more by bidding higher, and therefore
end up choosing lower prices with higher frequencies.
The situation is reversed when we compare the results
between K=65 and K=51 (Tables 24 and Tables 8
10). For K=51, the sellers end up choosing the lower
bins with lower frequencies as compared to when
K=65. In fact, if we look at the results for K=51
(Tables 810), we see that the sellers hardly discrim-
inate between the lower and higher prices. The sellers
know that even if they end up supplying the residual,
they still sell most of their capacity. Further, the impact
is reduced since he extracts higher per-unit profits as
compared to the winning bidder.
We run a chi-square goodness of fit test with each
of the simulation settings. The dChi-sq.T column in the
tables compute the v
2 statistic, whose sum is shown in
the final row, and this value is compared to the
corresponding chi-square value with p=0.05 which is
shown in the final column. As the results show, the fit
with the theoretical distribution is always very good.
In all the nine cases, we do not reject the null
hypothesis that the experimental frequency distribu-
tion follows the theoretical probability distribution. In
other words, the simulation run results in the agents
Table 6
Simulation run results with K=80 units, c=$40
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
53 312 307.6923077 308 0.060307692
56 190 500 192 0.027692308
59 144 631.5789474 132 1.172547368
62 108 727.2727273 96 1.582579904
65 78 800 73 0.382272727
68 49 857.1428571 57 1.160357143
71 40 903.2258065 46 0.802949309
74 36 941.1764706 38 0.100264137
77 25 972.972973 32 1.452752385
80 18 1000 27 3.015027027
1000 1000 9.75675 16.92
Table 7
Simulation run results with K=80 units, c=$60
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
66.5 284 307.6923077 308 1.824307692
68 197 500 192 0.114492308
69.5 140 631.5789474 132 0.538947368
71 99 727.2727273 96 0.114229904
72.5 79 800 73 0.541022727
74 61 857.1428571 57 0.260357143
75.5 48 903.2258065 46 0.079749309
77 36 941.1764706 38 0.100264137
78.5 35 972.972973 32 0.322752385
80 21 1000 27 1.344027027
1000 1000 5.24015 16.92
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distribution with every set of values of the parameters
K and c.
It is therefore observed that the artificial software
agents start off selecting their prices uniformly
throughout the interval of (p1, r), but gradually learn
over time to select lower prices with monotonically
higher probabilities except in the case of K=51. In
fact, the final frequency distributions show that the
learning is dperfectT within margins of statistical error.
The results have interesting ramifications in real-
world scenarios. Managers might not have the luxury
of learning over a large number of observations
themselves as in these simulations, but they can
utilize the borganizational memoryQ (i.e. the experi-
ences of him as well as his predecessors) to effectively
build the learning capability over time. Managers also
have their own intuition, which these artificial agents
lack that might result in accelerated learning towards
equilibrium (and therefore optimal) behavior. If this
learning process is considered to be the analogue of
the process by which managers analyze their past
actions, it becomes easy to understand how a mixed-
strategy equilibrium can develop as an emerging
behavior without the sellers actually resorting to game
theoretic calculations. Of course, real-life competition
would be significantly more complex than these
simple symmetric equilibria, and we wish to explore
these considerations in our future work.
5.2. The n-seller simulations
The success of the algorithm in the two-seller game
is unfortunately not replicated for games with n
sellers. We conducted similar simulations by using
the same sets of values for Q, K, c and r for n=3, 5, 8
Table 8
Simulation run results with K=51 units, c=$20
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
77.88235294 103 103.6585366 104 0.004183644
78.11764706 98 206.4777328 103 0.225878561
78.35294118 101 308.4677419 102 0.009609942
78.58823529 102 409.6385542 101 0.006795955
78.82352941 100 510 100 0.001301726
79.05882353 97 609.561753 100 0.065914653
79.29411765 102 708.3333333 99 0.105523202
79.52941176 101 806.3241107 98 0.092410952
79.76470588 99 903.5433071 97 0.032619704
80 97 1000 96 0.00306026
1000 1000 0.547298599 16.92
Table 9
Simulation run results with K=51 units, c=$40
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
78.58823529 98 103.6585366 104 0.308889527
78.74509804 102 206.4777328 103 0.00652682
78.90196078 98 308.4677419 102 0.156095416
79.05882353 101 409.6385542 101 0.000288392
79.21568627 99 510 100 0.018468592
79.37254902 102 609.561753 100 0.059712172
79.52941176 99 708.3333333 99 0.000528244
79.68627451 101 806.3241107 98 0.092410952
79.84313725 102 903.5433071 97 0.235098455
80 98 1000 96 0.024692913
1000 1000 0.902711485 16.92
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of the naRve RL algorithm led us to reject the null
hypothesis that the experimental data followed the
distribution in Eq. (4). In all these simulations, we
kept K=20 units, c=$20 and r=$80, while Q=50, 95,
150 and 190 for n=3, 5, 8 and 10, respectively. In all
these simulations, there was a general trend to form a
unimodal distribution somewhere near the midpoint of
the range.
These results are not entirely unexpected given the
simplicity of the underlying RL algorithm. As Ref. [6]
conjecture with their results in which some simu-
lations lead to quick convergence while others do not,
these may primarily have to do with the sometimes
complex strategy space in which relatively simple
kinds of learning might be going on. In other words,
while our algorithm was good enough to capture the
interactions between two sellers, it is inadequate to
capture the complexity of interactions between more
than two sellers. It is possible that the solution space
in multi-agent settings has multiple equilibria and the
simple RL algorithm is converging to an undesirable
(or suboptimal) equilibrium.
5 In a more general multi-
agent setting, an agent has to not only learn what
effects its actions have, but also learn to align its
actions with those of the other agents. For example,
consider what happens in a five-seller game, when a
certain price yields a relatively bhighQ payoff for a
seller (we will call him Seller 1). The four other sellers
react to that result, and as a result, there is a multitude
of interactions (each individual reaction starts a chain
of reactions from the remaining four sellers and so on,
as opposed to a two-seller model, where there is a
reaction from only one seller) which makes it difficult
for the RL algorithm of Seller 1 to bpin downQ the
exact cause of the increased payoff. It must be noted
that our RL algorithm utilizes just a single parameter,
which can be thought of the strength of the initial
propensities [6] that influences the rate of change of
choice probabilities. Ref. [6] also points to the fact
that in many RL scenarios, sellers who start away
from equilibrium can end up learning bvery different
thingsQ. For games with more sellers, the complexity
of the interactions increases the odds of such results.
Recent research suggests that the problem of
finding an equilibrium with multiple agents interact-
ing is yet to be tackled effectively. As Ref. [9] points
out, bthe issue of what happens when multiple
interacting agents simultaneously adapt, using RL or
other approaches, is largely an open questionQ (p. 1).
It needs to be noted that while the knowledge of game
theory can enable us to analyze the nature of a mixed-
strategy equilibrium, the basic underlying assumption
in such analysis is that of common knowledge, i.e. the
players not only know that all players are rational,
they also know that all the players know that all the
players are rational, and so on, ad infinitum. This
means that every player knows how each of the other
players would behave in every possible contingency.
In case of continuous strategy spaces, this would
essentially mean that the agents have to keep track of
unlimited possible contingent behavior of the other
agents. To look at the problem in another way, with
5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer in pointing this out.
Table 10
Simulation run results with K=51 units, c=$60
Bin Frequency
(Oi)
Th. Cum. Fr. Th. Freq.
dist. (Ei)
Chi-sq. Chi-sq. value
(p=0.05)
79.29411765 102 103.6585366 104 0.026536585
79.37254902 101 206.4777328 103 0.032187325
79.45098039 99 308.4677419 102 0.087657161
79.52941176 101 409.6385542 101 0.000288392
79.60784314 100 510 100 0.001301726
79.68627451 98 609.561753 100 0.024498086
79.76470588 99 708.3333333 99 0.000528244
79.84313725 101 806.3241107 98 0.092410952
79.92156863 100 903.5433071 97 0.079540552
80 99 1000 96 0.06706026
1000 1000 0.412009284 16.92
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them. The number of interactions between three
players increases to three, and in general, between
n players, the number of interactions is
n
2

.I n
comparison, our agents indulge in very simple
behavior, with limited look-ahead capability. While
it turned out to be enough in capturing the interaction
between two players, it is perhaps not so unexpected
that the simple algorithms failed to capture the
interactions between more than two players.
Some remedies can be considered to address the
shortcomings of our current algorithm. Advanced RL
algorithms make regular use of multiple parameters
like experimentation and recency [6]. Complex RL
algorithms with greater look-ahead capability can
decide on subsequent courses of action by analyzing
the payoffs of other agents in greater detail. Ref. [18]
notes that the choice of initial propensities can have a
long-term effect on the learning process. In real-life
organizations, managers can conceivably do much
better than choosing equal initial propensities by virtue
of their years of experience. In fact, the initial bin
probabilities can be established from past auctions for
similar items.
6 We conclude by noting that currently
our reinforcement is based on the updated average
profit in each interval. The choice of this particular
form of reinforcement was dictated primarily by what
we thought would be a bcommon senseQ approach by
organizations to tackle such transactions. Faster
convergence might result if we choose other reinforce-
ment mechanisms.
While we are currently addressing many of these
issues in our ongoing research, the results of our
simulations with the two-seller model show consid-
erable promise. The distribution of Eq. (2) is
certainly not intuitive, and is vastly different from
the uniform distribution that the agents start off with.
Still, using some common-sense rules of thumb, the
agents finally come to mimic the ideal distribution.
We hope that these results spur the interest of using
automated agents that will enable organizations to
effectively compete the increasing number of elec-
tronic transactions. While one of the main attractions
of B2B exchanges remains in their ability to automate
the processes by which organizations can participate
in electronic transactions with each other, the problem
of overseeing each and every one of them is still very
much an issue. This problem will likely exacerbate in
future as more and more organizations start to utilize
these electronic services. While the algorithms that
need to be used in real-world scenarios will be much
more complex than those presented in this research,
we think that organizations might over time develop
such algorithms of increasing sophistication. At first,
very basic transactions having routine processes
would be entrusted to such learning mechanisms. As
algorithms get more complex, and simultaneously
organizations also gain confidence in such mecha-
nisms, more complex transactions would probably be
entrusted. Organizations might also develop processes
by which unusual procedures set off triggers for either
human intervention or even a complete abort.
One issue of interest to researchers and practi-
tioners alike will be the cost of learning involved.
While the agents did learn the ideal behavior over
repeated simulations, there might be a significant
cost to the organization as their behavior starts as
being completely random, and therefore differs
significantly from the ideal in the initial stages. This
is a luxury that organizations might not have in real
lifein fact, if the costs are high enough, there
might not be any incentive for an organization to
utilize such automated agents. In such situations, the
importance of having experienced managers will be
realized, who can bguideQ these artificial agents to
much better initial bstarting pointsQ that would be
closer to the optimal solution, thus reducing the cost
to the organization.
A related issue is the rate of convergence of the
algorithm towards the theoretical equilibrium. For
example, the number of price bands should affect
convergence. Quite possibly, the time taken towards
convergence would increase linearly with the number
of price bands, and exponentially with the number of
agents. In such an environment, one interesting idea
that we wish to explore in future research is to have an
badaptiveQ number of bands, whereby we start off
initially with a few price bands, and progressively
increase their number to refine the search in the later
stages.
7
6 We thank one anonymous reviewer for the suggestion.
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this idea.
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Our research shows initial promise in the use of
artificial agents to automate transactions in elec-
tronic marketplaces. We successfully replicate the
theoretical results of mixed-strategy equilibrium in
capacity-constrained reverse auctions involving two
similar competitors through the use of artificial
agents that learn their ideal behavior over time by
keeping track of their payoffs. Reinforcement
learning was successfully employed as the learning
mechanism in this simulation. The encouraging
results show promise in the use of artificial learning
mechanisms that will enable organizations to take
part in the increasing number of transactions in
electronic marketplaces. Electronic marketplaces can
be enhanced and even specifically designed to
accommodate artificial agents working on behalf
of managers. Additionally, artificial agents could
certainly be used to assist managers in their
decision making in such scenarios.
In our future research, we intend to apply RL
algorithms of increasing complexity that will hope-
fully learn the idealized seller behavior in an n-seller
model. We also wish to consider more complex
models of competition (e.g. different marginal costs
and capacities of sellers, increasing the number of
buyers and sellers, etc.). Furthermore, the artificial
agents employed in this simulation could be enhanced
to capture a wider range of behaviors exhibited by
managers participating in B2B exchanges.
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